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Abstract
Attempts to achieve a comprehensive codification of the law of the sea were eventually successful
with the entry into force of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Australia played a key
role in the negotiations that led to the finalization of the 1982 Convention and this involvement
has shaped the manner in which Australia has subsequently dealt with law of the sea issues. This
paper reviews aspects of Australian practice as the 1982 Convention was being negotiated and
then considers Australian state practice by examining three case studies that have particular
significance for Australia and Indonesia: the Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes designation; the
MV Tampa incident and the maritime boundary conciliation between Australia and Timor Leste.
The paper concludes with some observations regarding how Australia’s approach to the law of
the sea has evolved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea1 was opened for
signature on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica.2 This occasion
marked the completion of nearly ten years of treaty negotiations
“… involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all
regions of the world, all legal and political systems [and] all degrees of
socio-economic development.”3
The LOSC provided that it would “… enter into force 12 months after the
date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession”4 and this
occurred on 16 November 1993 when Guyana submitted its instrument, with
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS
397 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [hereafter LOSC].
2
See LOSC Articles 305 – 307.
3
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, The Law of the Sea, United
Nations Publication Sales No. E.97.V.10, 1997, 1.
4
LOSC Article 308.
1
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the result that the Convention would enter into force twelve months later on
16 November 1994.5
While it is readily apparent that Australia and Indonesia are both large
maritime States, in terms of the LOSC each State has fundamentally different
characteristics. Australia deposited its instrument of ratification on 5 October
1994, just before the LOSC entered into force, and can best be described as a
‘coastal State’. The land area of the Australian continent extends to approximately 7.7 million square kilometers, while Australia’s maritime Exclusive
Economic Zone covers approximately 10 million square kilometers.6 On the
other hand, Indonesia ratified the Convention on 3 February 1986, perhaps
reflecting its early satisfaction with the inclusion of the new Part IV in the
final text of the LOSC,7 and its now recognized status as an ‘archipelagic
State’. Other types of States that are contemplated under the LOSC include
‘geographically and disadvantaged States’, ‘island States’ and ‘land-locked
States’. Each type of State has particular recognition provided in various Articles of the LOSC.
The paper will look at how Australia has approached the development of
the law of the sea by adopting the following format. First, a brief look at some
aspects of Australia’s participation in the three United Nations Conferences
on the Law of the Sea that have been held since the formation of the United
Nations in 1945,8 followed by some general comments regarding the current
approach that Australia seeks to adopt in dealing with its international legal
obligations and rights. Next, the paper will assess three case studies that have
The Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related
Agreements, which is available on the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea website, now lists
Guyana as the 59th party to deposit its instrument due to the removal of Yugoslavia (date of deposit 5 May
1986) from the Chronological list: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs,
United Nations, “The Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and
the related Agreements”, available at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_
ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20
Sea, accessed on 28 January 2020. Further details regarding the former Yugoslavia’s absence from United
Nations Multilateral Treaties can be found in Christian Tams “Article 308”, margin note 11 and footnote
33, in Alexander Proelss, ed, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, C.H. Beck/
Hart Publishing, 2017. See also Edward Duncan Brown, The International Law of the Sea, Dartmouth,
1994, Table 13.1, pp. 382-386.
6
“The Law of the Sea,” Geoscience Australia, accessed on 3 February 2020, https://www.ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/marine/jurisdiction/law-of-the-sea,
7
LOSC Part IV is titled ‘Archipelagic States’ and contains Articles 46 – 54 which describe the special
consideration that is provided for archipelagic States, including passage and overflight through, above and
under archipelagic waters by foreign ships and aircraft.
8
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva in 1958; the Second
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was also held in Geneva in 1960; the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held between 1973 and 1982. For a detailed history of the three
UN Law of the Sea Conferences, see Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea,
Hart Publishing, 2016, 6 – 14.
5
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attracted significant attention, or have particular significance, for the law of
the sea as well as having special resonance for both Australia and Indonesia
due to their association with both countries. These case studies will highlight
the legal issues that arose when:
1) Indonesia lodged its archipelagic sea lanes designation in 1996;
2) the Norwegian flagged vessel Tampa rescued people trying to reach
Australia from Indonesia in 2001; and
3) Australia and Timor Leste concluded their maritime boundary conciliation under Annex V of the LOSC.
There are important lessons that can be gleaned regarding Australia’s approach to the development of the law of the sea in general, and the approach
that Australia is willing to take in relation to the LOSC in particular, from
analyzing each of these case studies.
The paper will conclude with some thoughts about why Australia’s approach to the law of the sea has evolved in the way it has and suggest a number
of key themes that can be deduced from the topics that have been addressed
in the paper.

II. AUSTRALIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CODIFICATION
There have been a number of attempts to codify the law of the sea and
Australia has been involved in all of them. Australia was represented at the
1930 Hague Codification Conference that was held under the auspices of the
League of Nations, as well as being actively involved in all three of the United
Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea.9 The late Professor Ivan Shearer,10
writing in 1986, notes that a ‘distinctive Australian contribution towards the
codification and progressive development of the international law of the sea
did not emerge, however, until the United Nations First Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1958.’11 The two ‘notable’ contributions that were made by
Australia in 1958 were to:
(i) successfully take the lead in providing an acceptable definition for the
Ivan A. Shearer “Australia and the International Law of the Sea”, Archiv Des Völkerrechts, Vol 24, No 1,
1986, pp. 22-40; see also Geoscience Australia, “The Law of the Sea”, above n 7
10
Over the course of his long academic career, Professor Ivan Shearer (who died in 2019) also made an
enormous personal contribution to Australia’s understanding and involvement with law of the sea issues
as a scholar, practitioner, judge and member of the Royal Australian Navy Reserve. Recognition of this
contribution can be found in the Australian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 24 (2005) which was
dedicated to honor Professor Shearer’s achievements
11
Shearer, note 10 above, “Australia and the International Law of the Sea”, 23.
9
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term ‘natural resources’ in the Convention on the Continental Shelf;12
and
(ii) unsuccessfully chair the committee that was tasked with resolving the
long-standing issue of the maximum breadth of the territorial sea –
this issue was also the main subject of the Second United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960 but it could not be satisfactorily resolved on that occasion either.
Turning to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Shearer notes that in the period leading up to the first meeting of States for
that Conference there had been two ‘significant steps’ taken by Australia. The
first was the declaration of a twelve nautical mile fishery zone in 1967 and
the second was the proclamation of an extended continental shelf through
legislation that passed the Commonwealth Parliament in that same year.13
Additionally, Australia lodged protests when Indonesia and the Philippines
proclaimed archipelagic baselines in 1958 and 1961 respectively as Australia
did not consider such claims, with their potential impact on navigation rights
through each archipelago, were consistent with customary international law
that existed at that time.14
In terms of the major themes that were pursued by Australia during the period from 1973 – 1982 when the Third Conference was held, paramount among
them was the successful conclusion of a ‘widely accepted and comprehensive
convention on the law of the sea.’15 Clearly this theme has been achieved, with
the LOSC currently having 168 States party to the Convention,16 although perhaps not to the extent that Australia would have hoped during the long period
of negotiations due to the significant absence of the United States of America
as a State party. Other elements of Australia’s focus during the UNCLOS III
conferences included the establishment of a 12nm territorial sea, clarifying
the sovereign rights of a coastal state over the continental shelf, creation of a
200nm exclusive economic zone, marine environmental protections, setting
out the regime of islands that is now found in LOSC Article 121, setting acceptable parameters for marine scientific research, setting up a transit passage
regime that covered straits used for international navigation and archipelagic
waters, preserving the seabed beyond national jurisdiction as the common heritage of mankind17 and finally, but importantly, ensuring that the Convention
United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311
(entered into force 10 June 1964), Article 2(4) which is now reflected in LOSC Article 77(4).
13
Shearer, note 10 above, “Australia and the International Law of the Sea”, 24.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., 25.
16
See the Chronological list, note 5 above.
17
Instructions to the Australian delegation to the UNCLOS Conference that was held in Caracas from
12
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contained a strong dispute settlement scheme.
Australia, as evidenced by a statement made by Ambassador Ralph Harry,
who at that time was the Leader of Australia’s Delegation to Sub-Committee
II of the Seabed Committee18 and subsequently became the Leader of Australia’s Delegation to a number of the early UNCLOS III Conferences, also supported the establishment of a regime under the law of the sea that recognized
the unique position of those States ‘… which are genuinely archipelagic in
character.’19 Ambassador Harry stated that Australia recognized that
“… a State spread over a large area of ocean with its population scattered
throughout a large number of islands – over 13,000 in the case of Indonesia – cannot be expected to exercise political control effectively over its
component islands if those islands are separated by water accorded the
status of high seas.”20
This approach was reiterated by Ambassador Keith Brennan, who was the
leader of the Australian delegation to UNCLOS III from 1977 until its conclusion in 1982, in a statement to the Tenth Session of the Conference on 17
March 1981 when he stated that Australia:
“… wish[ed] to see a clear and agreed formulation of the concept of
20 June to 29 August 1973 included supporting the establishment of ‘An International Authority for the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction with wide powers to explore and exploit on its own behalf and to enter
into production-sharing agreements with and issue licenses to states, revenues earned by the Authority to
be distributed with a preference for the developing countries’ Ralph Harry “Law of the Sea”, University of
Tasmania Law Review 6, no. 3 (1980): 216; ongoing recognition of Australia’s interest in this topic can be
deduced from the active participation of Australia in both the Preparatory Committee that was established
in 2015, and the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference that was established in 2017, by the United Nations General Assembly to determine the text of ‘… an international legally binding instrument under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction’: United Nations, “Intergovernmental Conference on Marine
Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction”, available at: https://www.un.org/bbnj/, accessed on
31 January 2020.
18
Following consideration of the Report of an Ad-Hoc Committee established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1967 pursuant to UNGA Resolution 2340 (XXII), a decision was made by the General
Assembly on 21 December 1968, pursuant to UNGA Resolution 2467 A (XXIII), that a standing Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
(the ‘Seabed Committee’) should be established. After some initial work by the Seabed Committee, it was
subsequently tasked to act as a preparatory committee for the future UNCLOS III and three sub-committees
were established to assist with that task. Sub-Committee II dealt with ‘… the limits of national jurisdiction
(embracing the continental shelf, high seas, straits, and related matters)’: Ralph Harry, see note 17 above,
216.
19
Harry, “Law of the Sea” note 17 above, 216-217; see also quoted extracts from the Report of the Australian Delegation to the Sixth Session of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed
at the United Nations European Headquarters Geneva, Annex 17, p. 2 ff in Robert Miller, “Australian Practice in International Law”, Australian Year Book of International Law 5, (1975): 147-148.
20
Miller, ibid., 147.

459

David Letts

archipelagic waters, so that a long held aspiration of the archipelagic
States, many of whom are Australia’s close neighbors, can be realized.”21
However, Australia’s position in relation to the archipelagic concept was
not overwhelmingly and unreservedly supportive of the view put forward by
those States that sought archipelagic recognition. Australia also wanted the
position of coastal States’ rights in relation to any potential archipelagic waters to be properly considered, with particular emphasis on the preservation of
‘... an assured and unimpeded right of passage … through the waters enclosed
within an archipelagic state’22 as this issue was critical for Australia’s trade
and security interests in terms of maintaining the ability to exercise freedom
of navigation (and overflight) through the waters of the large number of archipelagic States that would eventually exist among Australia’s regional neighbors.
As an aside, it is noteworthy that until independence was achieved in
1975, Australia had administrative responsibility for Papua New Guinea pursuant to authority provided by the United Nations International Trusteeship
System.23 During the early years of the UNCLOS III series of Conferences,
Papua New Guinea was transitioning towards full independence, which was
finally achieved in September 1975, but until then Australia had responsibility for Papua New Guinea’s foreign affairs.24 A balance was needed on the
part of the Australian negotiating officials at UNCLOS III to ensure that the
interests of Papua New Guinea, as a future archipelagic State, were adequately
represented. Again, this issue was highlighted by Ambassador Harry when he
stated in 1973 that by
“… advocating that special consideration should be accorded to archipelagic states, my delegation, of course, has in mind also its special responsibility to the people of Papua New Guinea.”25
Throughout the remainder of the UNCLOS III series of Conferences, Australia remained a fully engaged participant. Australia unsuccessfully sought to
“Australian Practice in International Law”, Australian Yearbook of International Law 10, (1983): 398399.
22
Miller, “Australian Practice in International Law”, note 19 above, 148; see also Stuart Kaye, “Australia
and the negotiation of the law of the sea,”Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 7, no. 4 (2015):
260.
23
For information regarding the United Nations International Trusteeship System see: United Nations, “International Trusteeship System and Trust Territories”, available at: https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/
en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories, accessed on 29 January 2020
24
An abridged view of Papua New Guinea’s history can be obtained from the website of The Commonwealth Secretariat, “Papua New Guinea: History”, available at https://thecommonwealth.org/our-membercountries/papua-new-guinea/history, accessed on 3 February 2020
25
Miller, “Australian Practice in International Law”, note 19 above, 148.
21
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become chair of the Drafting Committee but when the vote was taken the Australian candidate (Ambassador Harry) was easily defeated by the Canadian
nominee. Australia’s representative (Mr. H. C. Mott) did however become the
rapporteur of the First Committee after the Canadian candidate withdrew his
nomination.26 Kaye notes that Australia was also involved with the activities
of a number of the ‘groups’ that emerged during UNCLOS III where such
participation aligned with Australia’s ‘… aims in relation to the Conference,
and its international affiliations.’27 Membership of, or involvement with, the
‘Western Europe and Others’ group, the Coastal States group, the ‘margineers
group’ and the ‘Oceania group’ were all beneficial to Australia at varying stages of the UNCLOS III negotiations.28 Finally, Shearer notes the ‘significant
part’ that Australia played in the formation of what became Part XI of the
LOSC dealing with the ‘Area’, as well as the attempts that were made by Australia to reach a solution to the objections of the United States that eventually
led to that country not accepting the final draft of the Convention.29
Overall, Australia played a very prominent part in the UNCLOS III negotiations, adopting a somewhat progressive approach that balanced its longstanding interests and security alliances with the reality of being geographically positioned in an area where the legitimate interests of regional states,
especially those that could make archipelagic claims, were unavoidably progressing. Of course, Australia did all of this with a very clear appreciation that
it too would obtain significant benefit from many of the new approaches to the
law of the sea that were eventually adopted in the 1982 LOSC.

III. AUSTRALIA’S APPROACH TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL LAW
Skipping forward a few decades, both the 2016 Defence White Paper30
and the 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper have made it clear that
Australia has a strong interest in ‘acting with others to support a rules-based
international order’ and this includes ‘tangibly support[ing] the leadership of
the United States to this end.’31 The 2017 White Paper also has many referSee Summary Records of Plenary meetings, United Nations document A/CONF.62/SR.7 available at
https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../diplomaticconferences/1973_los/docs/english/vol_1/a_conf62_sr7.
pdf&lang=E accessed on 3 February 2020
27
Kaye, “Australia and the Negotiation of the Law of the Sea, note 22 above, 261.
28
Ibid.
29
Shearer, note 10 above, “Australia and the International Law of the Sea”, 27-28.
30
“2016 Defense White Paper”, Australian Government Department of Defense, accessed on 29 January
2020, 70, https://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/.
31
“2017 Foreign Policy White Paper,” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
accessed on 29 January 2020, 79, https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/2017-foreign-pol26
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ences to the role that Australia has played in the past in supporting the establishment and operation of various international bodies, including the United
Nations in 1945,32 as well as contributing to ‘setting new rules and norms’
through, for example, ‘regional approaches to irregular migration and human
trafficking.’33 The brief summary of Australia’s approach to the law of the sea
negotiations outlined above is further evidence of the manner in which Australia has sought to engage and influence the outcome of those international
treaty negotiations that it has been involved with.
While acknowledging that Australia has played a prominent part in supporting the establishment and functions of a wide range of international bodies
for many decades, it is however worth considering what lies behind Australia’s relatively recent overt emphasis on the importance of a ‘rules-based global order’ as a key element of Australia’s Defense and Foreign Affairs policy. It
seems that making such clear statements regarding the value of ‘the rules’ sets
out Australia’s view that there is an ongoing need for continued adherence to
the normative principles that emerged in the voluminous treaty-making that
has occurred since the conclusion of the Second World War, regardless of
any accompanying uncertainty that might arise through the actions of those
States that use those same rules to interpret international law in widely varying ways. If viewed in this way, Australia’s ready acceptance and enthusiasm
for a ‘rules-based global order’ makes perfect sense from a security perspective where certainty and clarity provide undoubted benefits for Australia’s
continued prosperity, using the global international legal frameworks that are
already in place for the peaceful resolution of a wide variety of disputes including those that affect the region’s maritime areas.34

IV. CASE STUDIES
The next part of this paper will illustrate how Australia’s approach to the
law of the sea has played out in practice by briefly reviewing three case studies.

A. INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES DESIGNATION
As an archipelagic State, Indonesia is permitted to take full advantage of
icy-white-paper.
32
Ibid., 82 – 83.
33
Ibid., 83.
34
See discussion in Donald Rothwell and David Letts “Is there still a role for international law in the South
China Sea”, Asian Jurist (October 2018): 53-57.
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the provisions contained in Part IV of the LOSC, including drawing archipelagic baselines35 and designating archipelagic sea lanes.36 In fact, it is well
known that Indonesia is the only State that has sought to designate archipelagic sea lanes so far, with its submission being lodged with the ‘competent international organization’ during the 67th session of the International Maritime
Organization’s (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 1996.37 Having
been forewarned of this submission at the previous session of the MSC, Australia was among a group of institutions and States that also lodged submissions in relation to the proposed designation of archipelagic sea lanes, and
highlighted the major concern of these States that the Indonesian designation
only proposed three north-south sea lanes without any sea lanes being designated in the east-west direction.38
Balkin notes that Australia and Indonesia took a different approach to the
role of the IMO’s MSC in their written submissions.39 While Indonesia was
content with the MSC alone dealing with the topic of sea lanes designation,
Australia submitted that the issues at stake were much wider than only those
associated with ‘safety’ and therefore the views of other relevant IMO committees such as the Legal Committee and its Sub-Committee on Navigation
should also be sought. This view was not, however, supported by other delegations that were involved in the process, including the United States, so the
matter was left with the MSC.
In contrast, Australia’s position in relation to the absence of any proposed
east-west archipelagic sea lanes was widely supported, and Australia, the
United States and Indonesia undertook a series of consultations to try and
resolve the issue.40 The view expressed by Australia and the United States, on
behalf of other ‘user States’, was that navigation and overflight along eastwest sea lanes was one of the ‘normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation and overflight through or over archipelagic waters’.41 Accordingly, Australia took the view that the mandatory language used in LOSC
LOSC Article 47
LOSC Article 53
37
Rothwell and Stephens, International Law of the Sea, note 8 above, 275.
38
See Sebastian Leonard, Ristian Atriandi Suprivanto and I Made Andi Arsana, “Beyond the Archipelagic
Outlook” in Power, Leadership and the Regional Order, Christopher Roberts, Ahmad Habir and Leonard
Sebastian, eds. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 315; see also Rothwell and Stephens, International Law of the
Sea, note 8 above, 275-276.
39
Rosalie Balkin, “The Role of the International Maritime Organisation in the Settlement of International
Disputes” in Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea, Donald Rothwell and Sam
Bateman, eds. (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), 311-313.
40
Rothwell and Stephens, “International Law of the Sea”, note 8 above, 275; see also Hasjim Djalal,
“Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes” in Indonesia Beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing and Archipelagic
State, Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, eds. (ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 62-63.
41
LOSC Article 54(4)
35
36
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Article 54 (4) through the use of the words ‘shall include’ required Indonesia
to have east-west sea lane(s) in its designation.42 Although it has been reported
that Indonesia did consider this proposal,43 there was no change to Indonesia’s
submission to the 69th session of the MSC which maintained the position that
designation of the three north-south sea lanes was sought by Indonesia.44 The
consultations between Australia, the United States and Indonesia did produce
what has been described as ‘a general agreement or understanding on 19 rules
that would be applicable in the sea lanes’45 but the precise status of these rules,
and the inconsistency that exists with the subsequent Indonesian Government
Regulation 37/2002, makes their current relevance uncertain.46
Two significant outcomes arose from the Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes
designation process, and Australia was heavily involved in both of these. First,
as the sea lanes designation process had never been undertaken before, there
had to be some recognition that the IMO was indeed the ‘competent international organization’ to which such submissions should be made. The submission process itself, supported by the practice of all States involved, confirmed
that this was indeed the case.47 Significantly, the IMO at Australia’s suggestion
adopted General Provisions on the Adoption, Designation and Substitution of
Archipelagic Sea Lanes (GPASL) which is designed to both reflect the lessons
learned from the Indonesian submission and provide a guide for any future sea
lanes designation submissions.48
The second significant outcome was the compromise reached by the IMO
as a way of dealing with the Indonesian submission in a manner that would be
acceptable to Indonesia and other States. This compromise followed a suggestion from the United States that the Indonesian designation should be viewed
as a ‘partial proposal’ with an accompanying ‘partial designation’ by the
IMO.49 From the perspective of Australia, this compromise could be supported
on the basis that the more generous right of archipelagic sea lanes passage (as
opposed to innocent passage) would remain available in other archipelagic
waters50 and this outcome was ultimately adopted at the 69th session of the
Balkin, “The Role of the International Maritime Organisation in the Settlement of International Disputes,” note 39 above, 312.
43
Leonard, Supriyanto and Arsana, “Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook”, note 38 above, 315.
44
Ibid.
45
Djalal, “Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes”, note 40 above, 63-65 (the 19 rules are listed on pages 64
and 65).
46
Leonard, Supriyanto and Arsana, “Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook”, note 38 above, 315-316.
47
Rothwell and Stephens, International Law of the Sea, note 8 above, 275-276.
48
Tara Davenport, “The Archipelagic Regime” in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Donald
Rothwell, Alex Oude Elferink, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens, eds. (Oxford, 2015), 151, fn 129.
49
Ibid.
50
Balkin, “The Role of the International Maritime Organisation in the Settlement of International Disputes,” note 39 above, 312; see also Rothwell and Stephens, “International Law of the Sea”, note 8 above,
42
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MSC on 19 May 1998.51

B. MV TAMPA RESCUE AT SEA
The second case study involves events that took place in August 2001
when the Norwegian flagged bulk carrier MV Tampa rescued 433 people from
a boat that had departed Indonesia with people onboard who were trying to
reach Australia.52 MV Tampa was on a voyage from Fremantle in Western
Australia to Singapore as part of its scheduled program when the captain of
MV Tampa responded to a call for assistance from the Australian Maritime
Safety Authority’s Rescue Coordination Centre that a vessel (subsequently
identified as a wooden boat, the Palapa 1) was in distress. On 26 August 2001
the Palapa 1 was approximately 75 nautical miles53 from the Australian territory of Christmas Island, and when the MV Tampa reached the vessel the
Tampa’s captain assessed the condition of the vessel as being unseaworthy.
Accordingly, over a period of a number of hours on 26 August 2001 the 433
people in Palapa 1 were taken onboard MV Tampa and course was subsequently set for the Indonesian port of Merak. However, shortly after all the
people had been rescued from Palapa 1, a small delegation went to the bridge
of Tampa to meet the captain and they demanded to be taken to Christmas
Island. For a number of reasons, primarily those dealing with the safety of all
the people now embarked in MV Tampa, the captain decided to sail towards
Christmas Island. Once the Australian government became aware of the captain’s decision to sail towards Christmas Island, steps were taken by the Australian government to prevent MV Tampa from entering Australia’s territorial
sea and disembarking those who had been rescued at Christmas Island.
Reaction by the Australian government to this incident displays a ‘hardened’ approach to the various legal obligations that arose but this paper will
only address those legal obligations that specifically relate to the law of the
sea. The first issue of note is the obligation placed on States by Article 98 of
the LOSC.
Article 98 Duty to render assistance
276.
51
International Maritime Organisation, “Maritime Safety Commission – 69th Session”, available at: http://
www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MSC/Archives/Pages/default.aspx,c accessed on 4
February 2020.
52
The brief summary of facts provided in this paper are obtained from the judgement of North J. in Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Incorporated v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001]
FCA 1297 (11 September 2001) paras 14-43 (hereafter ‘VCCL v MIMA’) and Frank Brennan, Tampering
with Asylum: a universal humanitarian problem, University of Queensland Press, 2003, p. 207.
53
Seventy-five nautical miles is approximately 140 kilometers.

465

David Letts

1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far
as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being
lost;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action
may reasonably be expected of him;
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew
and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the
name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which
it will call.
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require,
by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbouring
States for this purpose
Clearly in this instance both Australia and Indonesia had fulfilled their
initial obligations under Article 98 by coordinating the rescue effort between
them, and Norway had similarly met its obligations as the flag state of the ship
as MV Tampa had responded to the call for assistance and taken the rescued
persons onboard. However, tension soon emerged between Australia and Indonesia, as well Australia and Norway, following the Australian government’s
decision to deny MV Tampa access to Australian territorial waters around
Christmas Island. Statements in the Parliament from Australian Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer made it very clear that Australia
was seeking the assistance of both Indonesia and Norway to resolve the question of where the ‘rescuees’54 should be taken,55 and in relation to international
legal obligations Mr Downer stated:
“It is important that people understand that Australia has no obligation
under international law to accept the rescued persons into Australian territory. I note that the fishing boat from which the 434 persons were rescued in international waters set off from Indonesia and was crewed by
‘Rescuees’ was the ‘neutral’ term adopted ‘clumsily’ by North J. in VCCL v MIMA, pp 17
“House Hansard Questions Without Notice: Illegal Immigration MV Tampa,”
Parliament
of
Australia,
accessed
on
30
January
2020,
https://parlinf o . a p h . g o v. a u / p a r l I n f o / s e a r c h / d i s p l a y / d i s p l a y. w 3 p ; d b = C H A M B E R ; i d = c h a m b e r
%2Fhansardr%2F2001-08-28%2F0004;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F2001-0828%2F0000%22,
54
55
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Indonesians.”56
It is certainly true that the LOSC does not deal with this topic at all, merely
providing the ‘Duty to render assistance’ under Article 98 that has been noted
above. The operationalization of search and rescue obligations has been set
out under the 1979 SAR Convention57 which is designed to ensure that no
area of the world’s ocean spaces is without a responsible authority for search
and rescue of those that need assistance at sea. However, as noted earlier,
Christmas Island and the waters in which MV Tampa picked up the ‘rescuees’
is located in the Indonesian Search and Rescue zone, and in the Australian
government’s view at the time, this created an obligation for Indonesia in relation to the people that had been rescued – regardless of the fact that the call
for assistance was relayed through Australia’s Rescue Coordination Centre.
Other law of the sea issues that arose during the Tampa incident include
Australia’s purported closure of the territorial sea to the Tampa which was
communicated through public statements from Australian officials to the
captain of MV Tampa58 and eventually not complied with when the Tampa’s
captain decided that the situation onboard his vessel could no longer be tolerated.59 The issues that arise here relate to LOSC Article 25 which permits
temporary suspension of innocent passage in the territorial sea to foreign ships
provided there is no ‘discrimination in form or in fact’ and that such temporary
suspension ‘is essential for the protection of its security.’ The right of innocent passage is set out in Article 17 of the LOSC and the meaning of passage
is stipulated in Article 18 and relevantly it includes ‘rendering assistance to
persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.’60 So, the question that arises
is whether MV Tampa, having performed its obligations under LOSC Article
98, could now seek to exercise a right of innocent passage in the territorial sea
around Christmas Island relying on the exception provided by LOSC Article
18(2) to vessels in distress. It is readily apparent that MV Tampa could not
claim that its passage was innocent per se, as the presence of the vessel in
Australia’s territorial sea would have clearly been inconsistent with a number
of the activities listed in LOSC Article 19(2), and therefore by definition the
passage of the vessel would not be innocent.
Tensions between Australia and Indonesia had been heightened following
Australia’s prominent role in the events of August/September 1999 when InIbid.
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (with annex), opened for signature 27 April
1979, 1405 UNTS 97 (entered into force 22 June 1985)
58
VCCL v MIMA, para. 21-22.
59
Ibid., 35.
60
LOSC Article 18(2)
56
57

467

David Letts

donesian rule in East Timor ended. The Tampa incident, which followed reasonably soon afterwards, put further strain on the relationship, with one critic
suggesting that the situation was eased with ‘an upstream disruption regime
being negotiated on a wink and a nod with a cheque book and the assurance of
silence.’61 In one sense, the LOSC had shown a certain degree of inadequacy
in dealing with all of the issues that arose when the Tampa responded to the
distress call and in the subsequent days before the ‘rescuees’ were removed
from the vessel, and other solutions to the ‘problem’ were required. On the
other hand, the LOSC was never designed or expected to single-handedly address every conceivable situation that might arise on, over or under the world’s
oceans, and the movement of people seeking asylum needed a response from
States that exceeded the remit of the LOSC.
The ‘Tampa incident’ highlighted that clarification of some aspects of how
people who are rescued at sea are dealt with was needed. The competing interests of flag State, coastal/archipelagic State, and ‘rescuees’ all needed to be
considered in more detail, as well as taking steps to address the response that
States could take to deal with those involved in maritime people smuggling
activities. In an effort to provide solutions for these issues, one of the more
immediate outcomes of the Tampa incident was the initiation of The Bali Process which is an informal ‘forum for policy dialogue, information sharing and
practical cooperation to help the region address’ the ‘consequences of people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime.’62 The
Bali Process emerged from a regional Ministerial Conference that was jointly
hosted by Australia and Indonesia in Bali from 26-28 February 2002 and has
now grown into a mature organization with nearly 50 States participating.63
So, although the Tampa incident saw a further increase in tension between
Indonesia and Australia in the short term, there were longer term outcomes
successfully initiated to deal with some of the problems and uncertainties that
arose at the time.

C. AUSTRALIA AND TIMOR LESTE MARITIME BOUNDARY
CONCILIATION AND TREATY
The third case study that will be briefly assessed is the historic conciliation
that has resulted in the settling of the maritime boundary between Australia
and Timor Leste.64 It is noted that the history of the maritime boundary disBrennan, Tampering with Asylum, note 52 above, 207.
“The Bali Process,” The Bali Process, Available at: https://www.baliprocess.net/ accessed on 2 February
2020.
63
Ibid.
64
The Australian Yearbook of International Law recently published a ‘Timor Sea Treaty Agora’ which provides four separate perspectives regarding the treaty negotiations and conciliation process: see Australian
61
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pute between Australia and Timor Leste is inextricably linked to the maritime
boundary negotiations that have taken place between Australia and Indonesia,
which have been written about by others on numerous occasions.65 However,
the focus of this paper is not to look at all of the technical issues regarding the
maritime boundary delimitations in any great detail, but rather to assess (or
perhaps speculate) how and why the position adopted by Australia changed
over the course of nearly twenty years, with the ultimate outcome being the
2018 Treaty between Australia and Timor Leste.66
The starting point67 selected for this section of the paper is the 2002 Timor
Sea Treaty, establishing a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) between East Timor and Australia which was signed on 20 May 2002.68 The
significance of this date should not be overlooked, as 20 May 2002 was the
date upon which East Timor, now known as Timor-Leste, ceased being administered by the United Nations Transitional Administration that had been
established for that purpose and became the world’s newest independent State.
Membership of the United Nations followed soon afterwards, with TimorLeste becoming the 191st member of the United Nations on 27 September
2002.69 A further treaty that ‘unitised’ part of the resources that were shared
between Australia and Timor-Leste was signed in 200370 and in 2006 the two
States signed the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea
(CMATS)71 which, inter alia, sought to exclude any proceedings being commenced by either party in relation to maritime boundaries for 50 years.72
Yearbook of International Law 36 (2019): 31-82.
65
For example, Clive H. Schofield, “An incomplete maritime map” in Law of the Sea in South East Asia:
Environmental, Navigational and Security Challenges, Donald Rothwell and David Letts, eds. (Routledge,
2020), 56-59; see also the opening statement of HE Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao to the Conciliation Proceedings between Timor Leste and Australia on 29 August 2016: Permanent Court of Arbitration,
“Conciliation Proceedings Between The Government Of The Democratic Republic Of Timor-Leste And
The Government Of The Commonwealth Of Australia,” accessed 3 February 2020, https://pcacases.com/
web/sendAttach/1889. (hereafter Gusmao opening statement)
66
Treaty between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Establishing Their Maritime
Boundaries in the Timor Sea, [2019] ATS 16.
67
As noted above, Australia and Indonesia have negotiated a number of treaties dealing with maritime
boundaries between the two States, but these treaties are not the focus of this case study. For brief details of
these treaties see Schofield, above note 66 and Elizabeth Exposto, “The Timor Sea Conciliation and Treaty:
Timor-Leste’s Perspective”, Australian Yearbook of International Law 36, 2019, 45-47.
68
Timor Sea Treaty between the Government of East Timor and the Government of Australia (with annexes), 20 May 2002, 2252 UNTS 3.
69
“Timor-Leste,” United Nations, accessed on 1 February 2020, http://data.un.org/en/iso/tl.html.
70
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Democratic Republic of
East Timor relating to the Unitization of the Sunrise and Troubadour Fields (the International Unitization
Agreement or IUA) 2483 UNTS 317.
71
Treaty between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, (hereafter ‘CMATS’), 12 January 2006, 2438 UNTS 359.
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CMATS article 4(1)
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Timor-Leste’s initial dissatisfaction with the treaties concluded with
Australia began soon after Independence Day in May 2002. During the Conciliation proceedings with Australia Xanana Gusmao stated that at the time
Timor-Leste entered into the treaties the country was ‘… in no position to take
informed decisions of our own.’73 He further stated that notwithstanding the
restrictions contained in the treaties regarding the establishment of permanent
maritime boundaries, Timor-Leste wanted to negotiate ‘… a permanent maritime boundary with Australia based on international law.’74
The years between May 2002, when the Timor Sea Treaty was signed, and
April 2016, when Timor-Leste commenced conciliation proceedings against
Australia, were punctuated with a number of related legal proceedings. TimorLeste brought a case against Australia in the International Court of Justice,75
as well as commencing two separate arbitrations in relation to the Timor Sea
Treaty.76 All of these cases have now been concluded, with the successful conciliation process77 being pivotal in achieving this resolution.78 One of the keys
to achieving this outcome was the involvement of an ‘… authoritative, highly
distinguished and fair-minded Commission with a balance of legal expertise
and diplomatic experience.’79 The Conciliation Commissioners were: HE Mr
Peter Taksøe-Jensen (Chairman), Dr Rosalie Balkin, Judge Abdul G Koroma,
Professor Donald McRae and Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum.
One of the features of all of the legal proceedings that took place between
Australia and Timor-Leste was the use, primarily by Australia, of a range of
different ‘objection mechanisms’. In a sense, Australia played ‘hard-ball’ and
sought to resist each of the proceedings taking place at all, primarily through
raising questions regarding jurisdiction and competence. This resulted in an
environment of distrust between the parties, and the prospect of achieving a
successful conciliation was not good.80 Notwithstanding this approach, the
conciliation process did proceed after the question of competence was deGusmao opening statement, 18.
Ibid.
75
International Court of Justice, “Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents
and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia)”, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/156, accessed on 29 January 2020, records the discontinuance of these proceedings.
76
Arbitration under the Timor Sea Treaty of 20 May 2002 (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Permanent Court of
Arbitration Case No. 2013-16 and Arbitration under the Timor Sea Treaty of 20 May 2002 (Timor-Leste v.
Australia), Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2015-42
77
Timor Sea Conciliation (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2016-10
78
Timor Sea Treaty Agora, see note 66 above.
79
Exposto, “Timor Sea Conciliation”, note 65 above, p. 54.
80
Ben Huntley, Amelia Telec and Justin Whyatt, “The Timor Sea Treaty: An Australian Perspective”,
Australian Yearbook of International Law 36: 31-33, 35-38; see also Exposto, “Timor Sea Conciliation”,
note 65 above, 51-55.
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cided, and has resulted in an historic agreement on maritime boundaries between the two States and may prove to be a useful model for other future
maritime boundary negotiations – perhaps between Australia, Indonesia and
Timor-Leste.

V. CONCLUSION
The review of Australia’s approach towards the development of the law
of the sea that has been conducted in this paper suggests an approach to the
law of the sea that can be identified through a number of key themes. First,
Australia is a strong advocate of the advantages and need for a normative
international legal structure that is built upon a solid treaty foundation, even
if this structure contains inconsistencies and flaws in interpretation – which is
clearly the case with the 1982 LOSC. Australia’s recent championing of the
so-called ‘rules-based international order’ in the influential Defense and Foreign Policy White Papers is testament to the emphasis that has been placed on
the strengths of a normative framework by Australia.
Second, Australia has had a mixed record of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in
terms of achieving the outcomes it has sought in a number of law of the sea
arenas. The issues raised by Australia when Indonesia lodged its archipelagic
sea lanes proposal allowed a compromise to be reached that has proved to be
enduring and acceptable to both Australia and Indonesia.
Third, Australia has been prepared to invoke some of the protections that
are available to a coastal state under the LOSC to protect its maritime borders
from unauthorized incursions. In doing so, Australia has been mindful of the
impact on other affected states, but has also used the authority provided by the
LOSC to achieve its stated objectives.
Fourth, it might be considered that Australia has taken a pragmatic approach to maintaining its place as a ‘solid international citizen’, especially in
relation to its settlement of the boundary dispute with Timor-Leste. Australia
did not easily succumb to the range of proceedings that Timor-Leste initiated, using available mechanisms to challenge each once. However, once the
decision was made that the proceedings were validly underway, Australia’s
approach altered to one of active involvement to ensure that the proceedings
could be concluded in a mutually beneficial manner.
In terms of how Australia’s approach to the development of the law of the
sea is likely to unfold in the future, it is contended that Australia will continue
to be an active participant in appropriate processes and will look to Indonesia
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for support and partnership for the foreseeable future. The Joint Statement between The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and The Government of
Australia81 following President Widodo’s visit to Australia in February 2020
contains nine paragraphs that highlight future maritime cooperation between
the two States, and these initiatives are testament to a continuing shared interest in maritime affairs.

Prime Minister of Australia, “Statement between The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and
The Government of Australia”, available at https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-0 accessed on
10 February 2020.
81
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